After finishing this book in February of 2024, I wrote,

 

"Although this book is definitely about getting the best outcomes in difficult circumstances when people disagree, it's more fundamentally about having great relationships with others. Highly recommended."

 

My clippings below collapse a 225-page book into 10 pages, measured by using 12-point type in Microsoft Word.

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See all my book recommendations.  

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Here are the selections I made:

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In this book, we will focus on three crucial levers that negotiators often ignore, underestimate, or mismanage, especially when they are accustomed to thinking of power in terms of money and muscle: •   The Power of Framing •   The Power of Process The Power of Empathy

Page: 6

      

Part I focuses on the amazing potential of framing. Effective negotiators know that how you articulate or structure your proposals can be as important as what you are proposing.

Page: 6

      

Part II focuses on the decisive role of process in determining outcomes. Negotiating the process astutely can be more important than bargaining hard on the substance of the deal.

Page: 6

      

Part III focuses on the tremendous power of empathy. A dispassionate and methodical approach to understanding the real interests and perspective of all relevant players can help to resolve even the ugliest of conflicts.

Page: 12

      

This is why it is a good idea to educate the other side at the outset about the limits of what you can offer and about the areas where you have more or less flexibility.

Page: 13

      

Convincing the other party that they will have to concede or withdraw from initial positions is not enough. You have to make it easier for them to back down.

Page: 14

      

Wise concessions on style and structure can help solve a problem more cheaply than costly concessions on substance.

Page: 19

      

The role of optics is especially pronounced when there is an audience. The audience can be voters, the media, competitors, future negotiation partners, a boss, colleagues, or even friends and family.

Page: 19

      

To think of their audience as “their problem” ignores a central tenet of most difficult negotiations: there is no such thing as their problem; what seems to be their problem, if left unsolved, eventually becomes your problem.

Page: 20

      

Think about how the other side will sell the deal, and frame the proposal with their audience in mind.

Page: 21

      

To put it simply: The safer you make it for the other party to tell you the truth, the more likely they are to do so.

Page: 21

      

Make it safe for the other side to ask for help on optics. Build a reputation for rewarding transparency and not exploiting their moments of weakness.

Page: 22

      

Avoid negotiating over a single divisive issue. Add issues or link separate one-issue negotiations.

Page: 23

      

Negotiate multiple issues simultaneously to help identify wise trades and to reduce the risk that concessions will not be reciprocated.

Page: 24

      

Don’t let any single issue become too prominent. Educate your audiences about how to measure success, and limit the amount of attention given to any one issue.

Page: 24

      

If there is only one issue, try to split it into two or more separate issues.

Page: 25

      

Incompatible positions might be hiding reconcilable underlying interests. Understanding why the other side wants something can lead to better outcomes than continuing to argue over competing demands or trying to meet in the middle.

Page: 26

      

In my experience, a useful message to send to the other party, in both words and deeds throughout the negotiation, is this: I know where I need to get; I’m flexible on how we get there. To put it another way: the more currencies you allow them to pay you in, the more likely you are to get paid.

Page: 26

      

Be as firm as needed on substance; be as flexible as possible on style and structure.

Page: 27

      

A wisely framed proposal need not resolve the entire dispute. Sometimes just getting unstuck is the key to paving the path towards eventual agreement.

Page: 31

      

The logic of appropriateness tells us that many of the choices people make are based on how they answer one simple question: What does a person like me do in a situation like this?

Page: 32

      

Framing an option as unique might make it more intriguing but less attractive.

Page: 33

      

Present your proposal as the default option to boost its appropriateness.

Page: 34

      

The party that drafts the initial version of the agreement or process gains leverage.

Page: 36

      

Establish a proper reference point. Even generous proposals can be evaluated negatively if the other side’s reference point is not set appropriately.

Page: 37

      

Always justify your offer, but don’t apologize for it.

Page: 41

      

Strategic ambiguity is a risky tactic that can pay dividends when used at the appropriate time in the appropriate way. It is risky because it creates an agreement that can be interpreted differently by different parties—we will revisit this problem shortly. But multiple interpretations can also be valuable. This is because sometimes the problem isn’t that the two sides cannot live with each other’s demands, but that writing down or announcing explicitly what you’re willing to live with is too problematic.

Page: 42

      

When neither side is willing to openly subordinate its demands on key issues or principles, strategic ambiguity—language that is deliberately open to multiple interpretations—can help the parties reach an agreement.

Page: 43

      

Strategic ambiguity should be used only when other mechanisms are in place to ensure compliance with appropriate behavior

Page: 44

      

Strategic ambiguity can help parties initiate relationships when there is insufficient trust for full commitment, but where being explicitly noncommittal is unacceptable.

Page: 47

      

Ambiguity should not be used as a substitute for genuine agreement on substance.

Page: 48

      

Ambiguity involves a trade-off between solving current conflicts and minimizing future conflicts.

Page: 48

      

If closing deals is rewarded, negotiators might conceal substantive disagreements to push through flawed deals.

Page: 49

      

Unfortunately, strategic ambiguity as a tool to “make everyone happy” can be effective in the hands of people who are actually creating no value in aggregate, but who will personally benefit from getting a deal done.

Page: 50

      

Ambiguous or incomplete agreements might be parasitic, meeting at-the-table interests at the expense of other stakeholders

Page: 53

      

There is a powerful first-mover advantage in framing. Whenever possible, seek to control the frame of the negotiation at the start.

Page: 54

      

If the existing frame is disadvantageous, seek to reframe as soon as possible.

Page: 56

      

Disputes are easier to preempt than to resolve. Decisions can sometimes be framed in ways that help people avoid confrontation in the first place.

Page: 57

      

Early actions can take on heightened significance. Look for low-cost opportunities to powerfully influence the frame and to establish the appropriate expectations and precedents for the relationship.

Page: 59

      

The good news is, there is light at the end of the tunnel. The bad news is, there is no tunnel. SHIMON PERES

Page: 60

      

THE WAR FOR AMERICAN independence between the United States and Great Britain lasted eight years, formally ending in the Treaty of Paris, which was signed in 1783.

Page: 64

      

Here are just a few elements of process to consider and try to shape: •   How long will negotiations last? •   Who will be involved and in what capacity? •   What will be on the agenda, and in what order will issues be discussed? •   Who will draft the initial proposal? •   Will negotiations be public or private? •   When and how will progress be reported outside of negotiations? •   Given multiple parties or issues, will there be one negotiation track or many? •   Will all the parties be in the same room at the same time? •   Will negotiations take place face-to-face or via technology? •   How many meetings will be scheduled?

Page: 64

      

How will major deadlocks or other problems be managed? •   Will there be outside observers or mediators? •   Will deadlines, if any, be binding or not? •   What milestones might help build momentum and keep the process on track? •   If the negotiations end in no deal, when and how might parties reengage? •   Who are the parties that need to ratify the deal, and how much support is sufficient for passage?

Page: 65

      

Have a process strategy: how will you get from where you are today to where you want to be? Consider the factors that influence whether, when, and how substantive negotiations will occur.

Page: 65

      

How do you get sufficient support for a deal that is certain to shock many of those who have been outside of the negotiation? Fortunately for Madison and other supporters of the Constitution (dubbed the Federalists), the process for ratification was tailor-made to help them overcome opposition by the Anti-Federalists.

Page: 66

      

A process strategy for deal making is not enough—you also have to strategize the implementation process. What will be required for successful implementation? How will you garner sufficient support for the deal? How will you ensure ratification?

Page: 67

      

Be the most prepared person in the room. Know the facts, anticipate the arguments, and understand your weaknesses.

Page: 67

      

Moreover, as the next chapter reveals, it is not enough to give process elements due consideration: process should be given precedent. Focusing on process early can sometimes help avoid deadlocks and ugly conflicts altogether.

Page: 70

      

But when it comes to important negotiations, process considerations should, in large part, precede substantive deal making: negotiate process before substance.

Page: 71

      

Negotiate process before substance. Understand and influence the process before diving too deeply into substantive discussions or concession making.

Page: 71

      

Misalignment on process can derail deals. Ensure—early and often—that there is agreement about what has been accomplished and what the path ahead looks like.

Page: 72

      

Even if you cannot influence the process, seek to get as much clarity and commitment on it as possible.

Page: 74

      

Normalize the process. If other parties know what to expect, they are less likely to overreact to or overweight the significance of doubts, delays, and disruptions.

Page: 75

      

Encourage others to normalize the process for you—and make it safe for them to do so.

Page: 75

      

Asking for clarity and commitment is valuable even if the other party is unwilling to provide them. It is better to know there is a lack of commitment and to adapt accordingly than to incorrectly assume that the process will unfold as you hope.

Page: 76

      

The risk of reneging is lower when commitments are personal, explicit, unambiguous, and public.

Page: 78

      

Before walking away due to a process breach, consider: (a) whether the other side considers it a breach, (b) how much each side loses, (c) how you will justify walking away, (d) whether they know how to remedy it, and (e) how they can do so without losing face.

Page: 79

      

Commitment to a rigid process is not always possible or advisable. If the process is flexible, make sure all parties understand the degree to which there is commitment.

Page: 83

      

Preserve forward momentum. Before using tactics to gain advantage, consider: how will this affect our ability to negotiate productively in the future?

Page: 84

      

Consensus certainly has its merits. There is something very appealing about having unanimous support for an agreement or decision. But the more people who have veto power, the fewer the degrees of freedom you have to structure a satisfactory deal, because there are too many demands on the limited resources available.

Page: 84

      

Consensus also creates incentives for “hostage taking,” as when someone knows that theirs is the final vote required and holds out for extreme concessions.

Page: 84

      

Consensus deals can be shortsighted. As the number of parties with veto power increases, the degrees of freedom for deal structuring decreases.

Page: 85

      

In complex deals and protracted conflicts, especially if hostage taking is a concern, a sufficient consensus approach can be more appropriate than seeking unanimity.

Page: 85

      

Keep a low bar for progress on individual elements of the deal, but a high bar for approving or ratifying the comprehensive final agreement.

Page: 86

      

The principle of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” can help overcome paralysis by allowing people to make concessions safely.

Page: 87

      

Transparency during the bargaining process can stifle progress. Give negotiators the privacy they need to structure the deal; give constituents the right to decide whether the deal is acceptable.

Page: 92

      

Most negotiations, even successful ones, leave residual conflict in their wake. Create channels and processes to manage subsequent flare-ups and latent conflict.

Page: 93

      

Stay at the table, especially after failed negotiations, to sustain relationships, understand the other side’s perspective, and look for opportunities to reengage.

Page: 94

      

If you are not at the table, you are on the menu.

Page: 94

      

If you don’t have a seat at the table, you might influence deal makers by creating value outside of the deal, or by offering to help sell or implement the current deal.

Page: 96

      

When “success” is not assessed in terms of a measurable “gain” but by the maintenance of a positive status quo (e.g., peace, continued cooperation, etc.), the causal link between effort and success may be unobservable.

Page: 96

      

In an entirely different context, the same principle might be useful in explaining why some in the United States have been caught up in the so-called anti-vaccination fad in recent years. Once a disease such as measles is largely eradicated and people do not have experience with the devastation it brings, it is easy to disparage the very vaccines that suppressed the disease and provided the comfort from which vaccine deniers wage their attacks.

Page: 96

      

There is a tendency, especially in times of peace, to underinvest in processes that can help maintain relationships and in institutions that can help sustain the peace.

Page: 98

      

THE VIETNAM WAR (1955–1975) was ostensibly fought between North Vietnam and South Vietnam, but it is often regarded as having been a proxy war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Page: 104

      

Parties can get bogged down with process concerns when there is inadequate preparation, an unrealistic goal of crafting the perfect process, or an excessive desire for strategic flexibility.

Page: 105

      

If substantive discussions are being thwarted by an excessive focus on process, (a) consider reaching an agreement on an imperfect but revisable process, or (b) begin substantive discussions in parallel with process discussions.

Page: 106

      

When power relations are unclear or unstable, process negotiations can become proxy wars for leverage and legitimacy, endangering substantive negotiations.

Page: 108

      

If you want to stand firm on process, it is best to (a) demonstrate that you seek equality, not advantage, (b) acknowledge and address substantive concerns that are linked to process choices, and (c) negotiate substance in parallel with process.

Page: 112

      

Early-stage interactions can provide a relatively low-cost opportunity to shape the terms of future engagement.

Page: 113

      

Your willingness to incur up-front costs in support of the process sends a credible signal of your commitment to it.

Page: 115

      

Label your concessions. Even genuine acts of kindness and wisdom can be interpreted as weakness or incompetence. Shape the attributions others will make of your behavior to ensure that you encourage reciprocity rather than exploitation.

Page: 116

      

If a destructive pattern is entrenched, label your future concessions.

Page: 117

      

Credibility is usually lost a little at a time. Safeguard your credibility by following through on your commitments, even the small ones.

Page: 121

      

Understanding, I think, is the most important thing when you are dealing with people—any people. You have got to make the effort to understand even the un-understandable. LAKHDAR BRAHIMI

Page: 126

      

But the more important consideration from a negotiation perspective is always this: How does the other side see their own behavior?

Page: 127

      

In negotiations of all kinds, the greater your capacity for empathy—the more carefully you try to understand all of the other party’s motivations, interests, and constraints—the more         you tend to have for potentially resolving the dispute or deadlock. In other words, when you empathize, you are not doing others a favor, you are doing yourself a favor.

Page: 127

      

Empathy expands the set of         you have for resolving conflict and reaching agreement. Empathy does not guarantee success, but a lack of empathy usually guarantees failure.

Page: 127

      

Empathy expands the set of         you have for resolving the conflict. The better you understand the other side’s perspective, the more likely you are to find a solution

Page: 128

      

Empathy is needed most with people who seem to deserve it least. The more intolerable their behavior, the greater the potential benefit of understanding it.

Page: 130

      

Create slack. If your calculus for retaliation ignores the possibility of mistakes or misunderstanding, the risk of unhealthy and inappropriate escalation increases.

Page: 130

      

There is almost always a trade-off between maintaining strategic flexibility and safeguarding credibility.

Page: 131

      

In my experience, while it is impossible to completely eliminate the trade-off between strategic flexibility and credibility, it can be managed more or less wisely. You can avoid many such conflicts if you follow a simple rule: do not make ultimatums that you do not intend to follow through on, and absolutely avoid making ultimatums if you can achieve your objectives without them.

Page: 131

      

Do not make ultimatums unless you plan to follow through on them—and even then, look for other means of influence that won’t sacrifice strategic flexibility.

Page: 132

      

Do not force people to choose between doing what is smart and doing what helps them save face.

Page: 133

      

JFK was essentially pointing to what social scientists have referred to as the “curse of knowledge.” The “curse” describes the following phenomenon: Once we know something, it becomes very difficult for us to understand what it feels like not to know it. That is, once we have learned something, or reached a conclusion, we seem to lose the ability to put ourselves in the mind-set of someone who has not yet had that realization—even though we were that person not so long ago.

Page: 133

      

Beware the curse of knowledge. Once we know something, we lose the ability to understand what it feels like not to know it.